SonicWall SRA and SMA vulnerabilties

Last year, Orange Tsai did some awesome research and discovered several vulnerabilities in SSL VPN providers which can allow an attacker to break into a network through the very device which is supposed to protect it. The vulnerable constructors were:

  • Palo Alto
  • Fortinet
  • Pulse Secure

I’ll admit I’ve always found it particularly ironic to discover vulnerabilities in security-related devices and we’ve had a surprising amount of success at discovering these at SCRT throughout the years.

While reading through Orange’s blog posts, I noticed one comment asking whether any other vendors were affected. Although I can’t find the comment any more (it was several months ago), at the time I figured I might as well have a go at finding vulnerabilities in one of the other VPN vendors. I pretty randomly chose to start looking at SonicWall who recently wrote a post indicating that their products were not vulnerable to the Palo Alto vulnerability. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Not knowing much about SonicWall’s products, I searched for what could be an SSL-VPN device and ended up finding the Secure Remote Access (SRA). Thankfully, it is possible to download a trial virtual machine of the device which I recovered and started to analyse. All analysis was done on version 8.1.0.7-22sv of the device, which seemed rather dated, but I couldn’t find a newer version anywhere. I think this particular device has actually been replaced or is in the process of being replaced by the SMA devices which are at least also partially vulnerable to the issues reported below.

I started off by looking at the web interface exposed for the SSL-VPN. This interface contains a number of CGI files in the cgi-bin folder. These can be called remotely and are just 32-bit ELF binaries that are run on Linux. I went through them to understand how authentication was handled to either find a vulnerability in the authentication system itself, but also just to figure out which files can be called without being authenticated.

One of these CGI files is supportLogin which is used to handle certain types of authentication. I discovered a couple of vulnerabilities in here which can be exploited without requiring an account though they need the “Virtual Assist” module to be enabled on the device. To be honest, I do not know whether this is a commonly used module or not.

The first issue I discovered is a SQL injection in a parameter called customerTID. The web application uses a SQLite database and constructs several queries with user-supplied input through the sqlite3 printf functions. In most cases, it uses the %q formatter to appropriately escape quotes. However, as can be seen below, in some instances, a %s is used instead. As this doesn’t perform any escaping, a trivial SQL injection is present.

This leads to a blind SQL injection vulnerability which can be exploited remotely. The most interesting data that is stored in this particular SQLite database seems to be session identifiers for authenticated users in a table named Sessions. If exploited at the right time, this would grant access to the SSL-VPN with various levels of privileges.

This first vulnerability was attributed the following CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-7481

In the same CGI file, a second vulnerability which leads to arbitrary code execution was also discovered. This one is a buffer overflow present in the parsing of the browser’s user-agent. The overflow can occur if the user-agent pretends to be Safari, as this results in calling the getSafariVersion function in the libSys.so library.

The getSafariVersion function looks something like what is below.

The memcpy function can be used here to overflow the local buffer. In the SRA, there is no stack canary, so overwriting EIP and using a rop chain to execute commands is simple. In the SMA, there are exploit mitigations in place and exploiting the issue would probably require a leak somewhere else or deeper investigations.

Nevertheless, crashing the CGI can be done with the following request:

GET /cgi-bin/supportLogin HTTP/1.1 
Host: 10.1.0.100 
User-Agent: plop Mac OS X Safari Version/12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234AAAABBBBCCCC lol Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 

The handler will restart automatically so it is possible to re-exploit the issue multiple times for example to brute-force libc’s base address. In practice after less than a 100 attempts, it is usually possible to get arbitrary commands to be run with nobody privileges on the device.

This vulnerability was given the following CVE : https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-7482

A third pre-authentication vulnerability is a pretty useless directory traversal, as it only allows to test for the existence of a file. In theory, if the file matches a certain structure, it would be possible to read parts of it. It was attributed the following CVE : https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-7483

In practice, I think this last issue can easily be used to figure out if a device is vulnerable to the two other vulnerabilities as they will likely all be patched together. Essentially, a device is vulnerable if the following requests takes a bit of time to complete:

/cgi-bin/handleWAFRedirect?repeated=1&hdl=../etc/doesntexist

It should take more time to complete than requesting an actual file such as:

 /cgi-bin/handleWAFRedirect?repeated=1&hdl=../etc/passwd

Three other vulnerabilities were discovered during the analysis, but they all require an account to be exploited:

  • CVE-2019-7484 – Authenticated SQL injection
  • CVE-2019-7485 – Authenticated Buffer Overflow
  • CVE-2019-7486 – Authenticated Code injection

The two first ones are very similar to what was described above, while the last is a straightforward command injection, but I believe it requires an admin account, so you can be the judge of the criticity. It can be exploited like this:

POST /cgi-bin/viewcacert HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.200.1
[...]
Content-Length: 67

buttontype=delete&CERT=newcert-3'--'
ping -c 4 192.168.200.123
ls

Regarding the timeline, I reported these issues on the 5th of June 2019 to Sonicwall’s team and the advisories were then published on the 17th of December 2019.

I had a quick look recently (so 2 months after the critical update was released) to see whether there are still unpatched devices out there. I only tested the directory traversal issue and obviously there are still numerous vulnerable devices exploitable from the Internet. This is why I didn’t go ahead and post the exploit code itself in here.