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	<title>Clément Labro &#8211; SCRT Team Blog</title>
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	<item>
		<title>Hijacking the Windows &#8220;MareBackup&#8221; Scheduled Task for Privilege Escalation</title>
		<link>/2025/05/20/hijacking-the-windows-marebackup-scheduled-task-for-privilege-escalation/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 May 2025 09:26:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pentest]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=7033</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The built-in &#8220;MareBackup&#8221; scheduled task is susceptible to a trivial executable search order hijacking, which can be abused by a low-privileged user to gain SYSTEM privileges whenever a vulnerable folder is prepended to the system&#8217;s PATH environment variable (instead of being appended). As I was working on a semi-automated research project on an unrelated subject, &#8230; <a href="/2025/05/20/hijacking-the-windows-marebackup-scheduled-task-for-privilege-escalation/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Hijacking the Windows &#8220;MareBackup&#8221; Scheduled Task for Privilege Escalation</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Reinventing PowerShell in C/C++</title>
		<link>/2025/02/18/reinventing-powershell-in-c-c/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2025 08:16:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Pentest]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=6726</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I like PowerShell, I like it a lot! I like its versatility, its ease of use, its integration with the Windows operating system, but it also has a few features, such as AMSI, CLM, and other logging capabilities, that slow it down. You know, I&#8217;m thinking about the performance gain here. I believe my scripts &#8230; <a href="/2025/02/18/reinventing-powershell-in-c-c/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Reinventing PowerShell in C/C++</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Exploiting KsecDD through Server Silos</title>
		<link>/2024/11/11/exploiting-ksecdd-through-server-silos/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2024 13:13:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=5731</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Earlier this year, an intriguing admin-to-kernel technique was published by @floesen_ in the form of a proof-of-concept (PoC) on GitHub. The author mentioned a strong limitation involving LSASS and Server Silos, without providing much details about it. This piqued our interest, so we decided to give it a second look&#8230; This blog post was coauthored &#8230; <a href="/2024/11/11/exploiting-ksecdd-through-server-silos/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Exploiting KsecDD through Server Silos</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
			</item>
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		<title>Ghost in the PPL Part 3: LSASS Memory Dump</title>
		<link>/2024/09/02/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-3-lsass-memory-dump/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Sep 2024 14:06:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=5136</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Following my failed attempt to achieve arbitrary code execution within a protected LSASS process using the BYOVDLL technique and an N-day exploit in the KeyIso service, I took a step back, and reconsidered my life choices opted for a less ambitious solution: a (not so) simple memory dump. After all, when it comes to LSASS, &#8230; <a href="/2024/09/02/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-3-lsass-memory-dump/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Ghost in the PPL Part 3: LSASS Memory Dump</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Ghost in the PPL Part 2: From BYOVDLL to Arbitrary Code Execution in LSASS</title>
		<link>/2024/08/15/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-2-from-byovdll-to-arbitrary-code-execution-in-lsass/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Aug 2024 09:46:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=5133</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In the previous part, I showed how a technique called &#8220;Bring Your Own Vulnerable DLL&#8221; (BYOVDLL) could be used to reintroduce known vulnerabilities in LSASS, even when it&#8217;s protected. In this second part, I&#8217;m going to discuss the strategies I considered and explored to improve my proof-of-concept, and hopefully achieve arbitrary code execution. The User-After-Free &#8230; <a href="/2024/08/15/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-2-from-byovdll-to-arbitrary-code-execution-in-lsass/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Ghost in the PPL Part 2: From BYOVDLL to Arbitrary Code Execution in LSASS</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
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		<title>Ghost in the PPL Part 1: BYOVDLL</title>
		<link>/2024/08/09/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-1-byovdll/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Aug 2024 07:37:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=5052</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In this series of blog posts, I will explore yet another avenue for bypassing LSA Protection in Userland. I will also detail the biggest challenges I faced while developing a proof-of-concept, and discuss some novel techniques and tricks to load an arbitrary DLL in LSASS, or even dump its memory. Bring Your Own Vulnerable DLL &#8230; <a href="/2024/08/09/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-1-byovdll/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Ghost in the PPL Part 1: BYOVDLL</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A Deep Dive into TPM-based BitLocker Drive Encryption</title>
		<link>/2023/09/15/a-deep-dive-into-tpm-based-bitlocker-drive-encryption/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Sep 2023 15:14:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=4580</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When I investigated CVE-2022-41099, a BitLocker Drive Encryption bypass through the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE), the fact that the latter was able to transparently access an encrypted drive without requiring the recovery password struck me. My initial thought was that there had to be a way to reproduce this behavior and obtain the master key &#8230; <a href="/2023/09/15/a-deep-dive-into-tpm-based-bitlocker-drive-encryption/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">A Deep Dive into TPM-based BitLocker Drive Encryption</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>CVE-2022-41099 &#8211; Analysis of a BitLocker Drive Encryption Bypass</title>
		<link>/2023/08/14/cve-2022-41099-analysis-of-a-bitlocker-drive-encryption-bypass/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Aug 2023 14:12:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Vulnerability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=4374</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In November 2022, an advisory was published by Microsoft about a BitLocker bypass. This vulnerability caught my attention because the fix required a manual operation by users and system administrators, even after installing all the security updates. Couple this with the fact that the procedure was not well documented initially, and you have the perfect &#8230; <a href="/2023/08/14/cve-2022-41099-analysis-of-a-bitlocker-drive-encryption-bypass/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">CVE-2022-41099 &#8211; Analysis of a BitLocker Drive Encryption Bypass</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Bypassing PPL in Userland (again)</title>
		<link>/2023/03/17/bypassing-ppl-in-userland-again/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:54:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=4008</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This post is a sequel to Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland and The End of PPLdump. Here, I will discuss how I was able to bypass the latest mitigation implemented by Microsoft and develop a new Userland exploit for injecting arbitrary code in a PPL with the highest signer type. The current state of PP(L)s &#8230; <a href="/2023/03/17/bypassing-ppl-in-userland-again/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Bypassing PPL in Userland (again)</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland</title>
		<link>/2021/04/22/bypassing-lsa-protection-in-userland/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Clément Labro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 12:30:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Exploit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pentest]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=2837</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In 2018, James Forshaw published an article in which he briefly mentioned a trick that could be used to inject arbitrary code into a PPL as an administrator. However, I feel like this post did not get the attention it deserved as it literally described a potential Userland exploit for bypassing PPL (which includes LSA &#8230; <a href="/2021/04/22/bypassing-lsa-protection-in-userland/" class="more-link">Continue reading <span class="screen-reader-text">Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland</span></a>]]></description>
		
		
		
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